(uskoro i na službenim jezicima BiH)
DROP QUOTE: “By improving the efficiency of institutions, reducing the influence of corruption and organized crime, and improving the rule of law and protection of human rights – all basic standards promoted by NATO – as well as increasing general security and stability in BiH and the region, the economy of BiH will see positive direct effects, which will ultimately equate to direct benefits for Bosnian citizens.”
AUTHOR: Goran Pranjić
AUTHOR NOTE: Goran Pranjić holds a Master’s Degree in Economic Sciences. He is an advisor in the Bosnian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Department for NATO and PfP. The positions presented in this paper reflect only the author’s views and not the official positions of the Ministry.
Historical data shows that the NATO expansion has so far had positive effects on the security and democratization of new members, and has contributed in general to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic zone. This article provides analysis of the experiences of NATO member states and discusses direct benefits that have resulted from Articles 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, seen as the key elements of a collective defense doctrine. It also illustrates how NATO membership and its accompanying security enhancements have directly influenced the growth of GDP and direct foreign investments, an increase in employment, and a general rise in the standard of living of citizens. The possible benefits Bosnia and Herzegovina could gain from the integration process and from future NATO membership is a special focus.
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The most frequently made assertion concerning the path toward NATO membership is that the accession process itself contributes to improvement of the security and stability of candidate countries. After all, from the first step of signing onto the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Framework and through active participation in the integration process, taking advantage of available tools and programs, a state confirms its commitment to respect liberal values. Each partner state, regardless of whether its goal is NATO accession or not, takes on a certain number of far-reaching political obligations, such as: protection of the democratic character of society; support and preservation of the principles of international law; and the fulfillment of obligations resulting from the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act, and international agreements on disarmament and weapons control. These states are also obliged to refrain from threats or use of force against other states, to respect existing borders, and to solve disputes in a peaceful manner.
In addition, the PfP Framework provides an avenue to every partner country that feels its territorial integrity is under threat, or its political independence or security is at risk, to consult with NATO. This does not compel NATO to act as Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty does in the case of a threatened NATO member, but nevertheless presents a clear signal that NATO is prepared for and interested in finding solutions that help create stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic region.
NATO supporters insist that NATO is not just a military alliance, but a security alliance of the international community based in shared norms and values. This is also reflected in the North Atlantic Treaty Preamble, according to which the signatory states declare themselves ready to protect their shared values and not just their individual national autonomies exclusively.
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The idea that a broad acceptance of liberal norms and values would contribute to stability in Europe was the basis for the most important NATO expansion after the end of the Cold War, when 12 states from Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union joined the Alliance. Although enemies not long ago, through the partnership process, a growth of trust and collaboration, and a readiness to accept the values and norms set forth and promoted by NATO, these states are stable European democracies today.
A proponent of NATO expansion and the US Deputy Secretary of State from 1994 to 2001, Strobe Talbott concluded in 1995 that NATO is the mainstay of stability in Europe and said that potential candidates must “make convincing progress in resolving disputes with their neighbors peacefully and show they are committed to multi-ethnic democracy.” The standards for acceptance of new members into NATO were different during the Cold War and in the early nineties; geostrategic interests dominated NATO expansion at the time and some significant inter-ethnic problems within and between former Eastern Bloc states were resolved only after their admittance to the Alliance. Talbott himself claimed that the full accession of Hungary and Romania to NATO and the EU “would confirm their existing border and guarantee the rights of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania.”
Actually, this issue has not been completely resolved yet, and is from time to time still a source of conflict between Romania and Hungary, although not to the degree that it is a threat to peace. Considering that a pre-condition for NATO membership is the peaceful resolution of disputes with neighboring countries, the common wisdom is that NATO, and later EU, membership was a very big “carrot” for both of these countries, motivating them to find a mutually beneficial solution to this issue in a peaceful manner. It is important to point out, too, that Hungary joined NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004, while Romania did not join NATO until 2004 and the EU in 2007; and Hungary was the strongest promoter of a quick accession for Romania to these two international organizations.
NATO is often used as a tool of conflict prevention and the best example of this is in the conflict between Turkey and Greece over the issue of Cyprus. Namely, Turkey and Greece have reached the verge of the war three times in the last 30 years, but it has been avoided through the direct intervention and influence of the US and NATO. In addition to the issue of Cyprus, relations between Turkey and Greece are also burdened by their maritime border and the exploitation of natural resources in the Aegean Sea, as well as the issue of inflow of economic immigrants from Turkey to Greece. Relations between the two countries were therefore far from ideal at the time of their NATO accession, but it was the accession process that prevented their total deterioration. In the last few years, both countries have taken action to improve their political and economic relations, aimed at decreasing tensions and weapons proliferation and, at the same time, meant to increase trust and the scope of cooperation, and to normalize relations.
The early years of NATO and the experiences of some of its initial member states are instructive examples of how membership can inspire the transformation of an entire society. Italy, for instance, was run by a fascist dictatorship just twenty years before joining the Alliance. The country’s accession to NATO was at first met with great resistance by the UK, but American influence shifted this opinion. The Americans believed that acceptance of Italy into NATO would reduce the influence of the communist party in the country and increase the influence of a Christian-democratic government and other pro-West political forces.
West Germany faced similar opposition when its NATO accession was contested by France. In that case, too, the United States managed to convince its allies that NATO membership would help Germany turn away from its totalitarian past. This indeed turned out to be the case; the acceptance of West Germany in 1955 marked the successful beginning of French-German reconciliation, which became the foundation for strengthening and expanding the European Union. After almost 60 years of NATO membership, it would be difficult to name a country on the European continent that has stronger democratic institutions than Germany.
Another successful example is Spain, which transitioned to civil control of the Spanish Army when it completed accession in 1982, thereby ensuring the country’s development into a democratic society. In this way, NATO contributed to the prevention of any future military coup d’états in Spain. For, upon joining NATO, Spain left three decades of fascist dictatorship and the dark times of Franco behind in the name of stability and democracy.
In a text published in The Economist 1997, former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright successfully summarized the historical experiences of and arguments for NATO expansion, saying that NATO “helped France and Germany reconcile with each other, making European integration possible. With other institutions, it brought Italy, then Germany, and eventually Spain back into the family of European democracies. It denationalized allied defense policies. It has stabilized relations between Greece and Turkey. All without firing a shot.”
Through enlargement, NATO makes itself stronger and more stable. As former US President Bill Clinton put it in a 1997 letter to the American Congress, “By admitting new states to the alliance, NATO will limit and help eliminate a potentially destabilizing vacuum in Europe, widening the circle of like-minded nations sharing common values and willing to shoulder common responsibilities and burdens.”Historical experience offers us strong evidence that NATO expansion does in fact lead to stability. So far, NATO member countries have not waged mutual wars; their participation through NATO in systems of consultation encourages parties to a potential conflict, as we saw in the example of Turkey and Greece, to find a peaceful solution.
After the last wave of NATO expansion, following the end of the Cold War, new standards for the acceptance of members were introduced; among them the benchmark that each country must solve its problems with neighboring countries before becoming a full-fledged member. And, when a country becomes a member, mutual trust is achieved through transparency in military planning and the adaptation of military forces for collective defense. Some other standards for membership were also raised, related to fighting corruption and organized crime, improvements to the judicial system and to the efficiency of institutions, evidence of the ability to participate in NATO-led operations, and the transformation of armed forces, etc. If we depend on historical analogies, faster NATO expansion into post-Yugoslav countries would seem to contribute significantly to stabilization and the proliferation of democracy in the region, yet these new standards have become barriers to accession for some of these states.
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The first and most fundamental benefit of NATO membership is the exercise of rights and obligations proscribed by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which guarantees defense by the whole Alliance to attacked member states. To date, Article 5 of the Treaty has only been used once, immediately after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in the United States, when the country requested its implementation. Allies responded by mobilizing certain military-technical capacities, confirming the unity of the Alliance and proving that the Article 5 mechanism is real and not just a dead letter. Although used only this once, this commitment to collective defense is reaffirmed at each NATO summit; and Article 5 is seen as having contributed most to the maintenance of peace in Europe over the last 64 years, and as one of the foundational deterrents to military conflict between the two military blocs of the Cold War. NATO membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina would expand the operational zone of Article 5 and would provide security guarantees, of sovereignty and territorial integrity, to BiH.
It is important to note, too, that provisions of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty afford the right to every state to call for consultations whenever deemed necessary and when any member state feels its territorial integrity, political independence, or security is threatened. Such consultations were recently called for by Turkey due to the threat of the conflict in Syria spreading to Turkey. The allies gave their full support to Turkey, confirmed NATO unity, and gave Syria, and the whole world, the clear message that an attack against one member state is an attack against the whole Alliance. As a concrete if symbolic form of support, allies deployed “Patriot” missile defense systems on the Turkish-Syrian border capable of taking Syrian missiles down before they enter Turkish airspace.
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Often, an increase in direct foreign investments is the only declared benefit of NATO membership. Very little attention is paid to the positive influence of NATO membership on encouraging local businesses to invest more freely in the domestic economy. While direct foreign investments are a truly important factor for the growth and development of a country, they are not the only one. In respect to the effects of NATO membership on the economy of BiH, one should take into consideration both the domestic and foreign dimensions. Transforming the perception of BiH as a country of war, a Balkan country, a country of insecurity, is another very important issue. By improving the efficiency of institutions, reducing the influence of corruption and organized crime, and improving the rule of law and protection of human rights – all basic standards promoted by NATO – as well as increasing general security and stability in BiH and the region, the economy of BiH will see positive direct effects, which will ultimately equate to direct benefits for Bosnian citizens.
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Improvements to security and stability have a direct influence on perceptions of certainty in the business environment. Certainty will be strengthened through the security and stability gained by NATO membership and will reduce the political risk of business activities, making BiH more attractive for investments by domestic businesses, which has a direct influence on the adoption of business strategies as they relate to the business cycle. In a psychological sense, in a business environment which is safe, stable, and predictable, local actors more easily make decisions to take business risks. This leads to improvements in the investment climate, the growth of employment, increased competitive capacities, export growth, and a rise in citizens’ standard of living. The elimination of insecurity and a reduction of political risks therefore have a direct influence on risk reduction in the financial market. Local banks, regardless if whether they are foreign or locally owned, can get more favorable loans, reducing the price of capital when marketing loans. This invites a more liberal business policy on the part of banks, which leads to credit expansion, lower interest rates, and improves conditions for obtaining the necessary financial capital for new business. Cheaper capital contributes to reduced costs of investments, which directly impacts investment return speed, which again positively influences the adoption of business decisions on new projects. In lower interest rate conditions, the acceptable return rate an investment must have in order to fulfill the criterion of profitability is also reduced, which leads to a potential revival of projects that were not profitable in higher interest rate conditions. All this leads to further growth of employment, improvement in economic performance of the state, and the growth of gross domestic product. If we look at the impact of NATO membership on changes in GDP rates, we can see corroboration of the notion that joining NATO leads to GDP growth. GDP growth can indeed be noted in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, which all joined NATO in 1999; there was a small correction following accession, until 2002, but constant GDP growth has been recorded since then. This uptick corresponds to these countries’ accession to the EU in 2004.
For the Baltic countries, it is a little bit more difficult to observe the impact of NATO accession on GDP growth because all three countries joined both NATO and the EU in the same year. Regardless, the data shows that these countries have also experienced constant GDP growth in comparison to pre-accession years. For example, in 2004, their year of accession, GDP growth in Estonia rose between 6 and 7% compared to 2003, and in Latvia the rise was 8%. A similar trend of rapid growth was also noted in the years that followed. The same occurred in Slovenia and Slovakia, where significant GDP growth was noted after their accession to NATO and the EU, and in Romania and Bulgaria a trend of GDP growth started upon NATO accession and continued after EU accession.
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NATO membership will open up the possibility for the BiH military industry to compete in NATO tenders and in programs for deliveries of weapons, materials, and equipment. This access is limited to NATO member states only, but BiH will get the chance to participate in a series of procurement programs for NATO forces upon its accession. The military industry – mostly the production of military equipment for export – is considered among the biggest potential opportunities for the economy of BiH. The fact is that this potential has hardly been tapped and a prewar scope of production has not been resumed. Joining NATO alongside the modernization of the Armed Forces of BiH presents an exceptional opportunity to develop the capacity of the military industry. One need not go far to see that modernization programs implemented by the Republic of Croatia in its armed forces, through various offset programs with foreign partners, have improved the performance of this sector and the economy as a whole. Also, the introduction of locally-made rifles and pistols as the equipment of the Croatian Army, as well as the construction of patrol boats in domestic shipyards, will significantly contribute to domestic development.
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If one views BiH as a player in the very competitive market for attracting foreign capital, which of course plays a very important role in encouraging economic activity, the issues of security and stability are very important in encouraging foreign investors to choose to put their money in BiH. Through NATO membership, BiH will send a message to the global investment community that it has met preconditions and is on a comparable level to other member states, which will significantly improve its competitive position as it relates to attracting direct foreign investments. Political risk is also a key consideration for foreign investors when they assess whether they will invest in a country or not. There is a direct link between NATO membership and a reduction of political risk, and between the reduction of political risk and an increase in stability and security of a state. In developing countries such as BiH, the reduction of political risk is followed by an increase in direct foreign investments and vice versa. Foreign investments will contribute to improving the overall competitiveness of BiH, and to the advancement of new technologies and the education of new local experts; and it will stop the “brain drain.” Also, such development reduces the share of speculative foreign investments which, as a rule, are of short term character and aimed at making quick profit. Certainty, long-term security, and stability will contribute to shifting the nature of direct foreign investments from short term and speculative to long term and sustainable. Some examples of the very prominent influence of NATO accession on increased direct foreign investments can be found in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, which, after joining NATO in 1997, reported a significant increase; by some counts these investments even doubled.
Empirical evidence supporting the idea that NATO membership reduces political risk is very strong. In the year Bulgaria joined the Alliance, direct foreign investments grew 47.5% and in Romania the increase was 166.29% over the year before. Although in 2004, the year Estonia joined, it reported a fall in direct foreign investments of 5.72% compared to the previous year (when direct foreign investments had increased by 167.75%), by 2005 it had already reported an increase of 190.84%. Lithuania reported an impressive growth of direct foreign investments, at a rate of 289.38%, and Latvia saw a 90.07% increase in the year of their accession to NATO. The situation was similar in Slovenia and Slovakia, which joined NATO in 2004; high growth rates of direct foreign investments were reported in the years immediately preceding their accessions (in 2002 the direct foreign investments growth rate in Slovakia was an astronomical 317.96% over 2001 and in Slovenia it was 148.7%), then in the year of accession direct foreign investments fell in Slovakia (by 39.89%) but increased in Slovenia (by 27.59%). Notably, in the years that followed, both countries have continuously reported an increase in direct foreign investments.
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Given that accession is a strategic foreign policy priority and a legal obligation, the integration process and efforts to fulfill the conditions for NATO membership will create an environment that is more supportive of the lives of BiH citizens. We have already seen the positive influences of NATO on the states of Central and Eastern Europe in terms of improvements to stability, democratization, and the economy. But joining NATO is not something that happens overnight, at least not in our case. It is a process that depends on the adaptability of aspiring countries to the conditions and standards promoted by NATO. And each candidate country for full NATO membership must also consider soft membership criteria, not just the hard criteria (such as the interoperability of armed forces, sufficient number of tanks and infantry, etc.). After all, accession requires the total interoperability of a country with other member states; and interoperability must and should be exercised in all spheres of society.
Through the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO defines which principles, conditions, and standards aspiring member countries must meet in order to achieve NATO membership. Among others, future members are expected to be “determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” They are also counted on to “contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.”
Accordingly, BiH will not become a NATO member if democracy and the rule of law are not strengthened, if the influence of corruption and organized crime is not reduced, if the judicial system is not improved, and if the efficiency of local institutions is not developed. The benefits gained from improvements in all these areas will be enjoyed by every citizen of BiH across the country. And so it is important to keep in mind that these adaptations are needed for our own sake, not for the sake of the Americans, the Germans, or any other NATO member. For, in order to become a member, our country must represent added value to NATO, no matter how incremental. When we have developed such added value, and are recognized in the elite club of the most developed countries in the world, then the benefits of efficiency, good organization, stability, and security in BiH will be plainly clear to all citizens.
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Guided by the basic principles of the Treaty, and through the NATO integration process and its required adaptations, our country’s internal political paradigm will shift so that permanent peace for all people, regardless of their ethnic or religious background, will be insured. From a regional perspective, regional security cooperation through permanent consultations and agreements will create the conditions for peaceful coexistence with neighboring countries, which will enhance the progress of every individual and community in the collaborative states as well as each state as a whole. Almost all countries in the region, except Serbia and thus far Kosovo, are in the accession process to or have already joined NATO. There are also parallel integration processes occurring in other countries in the region, in compliance with the basic principles contained in the North Atlantic Treaty (including achieving standards related to solving open issues, as promoted by Article 1) and provisions of the UN Charter, which are already contributing, and will continue to contribute in the future as these countries join NATO, to increased stability and security – and this regional adaptation will also be of direct benefit to the citizens of our country.
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As an aspiring NATO state, BiH has shown initiative by the inclusion of as many of the institutions within NATO’s committee system as possible for dealing with cyber defense, corruption, civil-military cooperation, energy safety, the fights against proliferation and terrorism, response to crisis situations caused by natural disasters, and more. Within the NATO policy of “smart defense,” with its guiding idea of “No fat just muscle,” BiH will incur joint defense costs once it becomes a member, but these will be immeasurably lower than the cost of BiH self-defense against such threats. The duplication of capacities and the unnecessary use of scarce financial means will be avoided, while at the same time the joint-system achievements of NATO will be at our disposal. Efficiency in fighting modern threats will increase, and the relationship between costs and benefits will be incomparably more favorable for BiH, once it is a NATO member and is no longer looking in from the outside.
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With full-fledged membership in NATO, BiH will become part of the Alliance’s decision-making mechanism, which is of course consensus-based, meaning practically that NATO will be unable to make a decision without BiH approval. This mechanism guarantees NATO members their independence and prevents the will of one state from being imposed if another disagrees. At the same time, this mechanism does not mean that BiH will and should obstruct, with no reason, NATO’s decision making; and the decision-making process is in fact preceded by a rather comprehensive process of consultation and confrontation that results in a decision deemed “appropriate” by all NATO members in most cases.
There are a number of examples of the Alliance’s inability to make decisions – the lack of consensus for NATO-led intervention in Iraq, for one. Closer to home is the lack of consensus on the issue of Macedonian accession. Interestingly, though it is widely known that Greece opposes it, as the issue of Macedonia’s name remains unresolved, this fact is not recorded anywhere in official NATO sources. In this case, NATO unity and solidarity is at work in presenting this view as unanimous.
In addition to consensus, there is another expression of support in NATO – constructive abstention. This means that, during a decision-making procedure, a member state does not block the decision but exercises the sovereign right not to take part in implementation of the decision once it is made. One instance of this was in the NATO-led operation in Kosovo. Analysis of publicly available information about the states that participated in this operation (KFOR) show that 24 NATO member states engaged troops. It is the sovereign right of the remaining 4 that did not participate to do just that and no one can order or their participation or make a condition of it.
However, there is no free-of-charge security, and NATO membership will require certain financial payments and obligations. But, as this article has detailed, the experiences of other member states show that the benefits resulting from the membership are much greater than any costs. Thus, the question regarding NATO membership is not, “Will it have benefits?” but rather, “Will we manage to develop an intelligent approach that takes advantage of all the opportunities at our disposal, for our own best interests?”
 For more, see: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO A to Z, “The Partnership for Peace programme,” March 5, 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm
 See Article 8 of the Framework: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, e-Library, “Partnership for Peace: Framework Document,” Brussels, January 10-11, 1994, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110b.htm (accessed June 26, 2013).
 The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, DC, April 4, 1949. Available at: http://www.nato.int/nato_static/
assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf (accessed May 20, 2013).
 Strobe Talbott, “Why NATO Should Grow,” New York Review of Books, August 10, 1995, 5.
 Ibid, 6.
 The first conflict occurred when Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 and created a satellite state – Northern Cyprus. After the conflict was suspended, a UN peace mission (UNFICYP) was established. During the conflict, about thousand Turkish soldiers and five hundred Cypriot soldiers were killed, and 250,000 people were expelled or displaced. Political negotiations restarted in 1975, and for the next two and a half decades the Cyprus conflict was mostly played out at the table. In February 1975, the Turkish side proclaimed its own federal unit and, after a delay in negotiations, proclaimed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983. The European Union accepted only Southern Cyprus as a member in 2004.
The second small incident took place in 1987, when the Turkish ship Sismik neared Greek waters during exploration activities. Greece ordered the sinking of the ship, but Turkish withdrew it and conflict was averted.
The third incident occurred in 1996, when the Turkish and Greek armies came ashore at the same time on the Aegean islets of Kardak and Imia in late January. At almost the very last moment, a Turkish-Greek war over a barren and uninhabited island only 800 meters long was stopped. Credit for preventing the conflict goes to a large extent to US President Bill Clinton who, through his mediation, stopped a war at the midnight hour.
 Talbott, 4.
 Madeleine Albright, “Enlarging NATO: Why Bigger is Better,” The Economist, February 14, 1997.
 William J. Clinton, “Letter to Congressional Leaders Transmitting a Report on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” February 24, 1997. Available at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
 See Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (cited above).
 See Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
 There are three sources of political risk: direct (nationalization, confiscation, crime, terrorism), indirect (civil unrest, inefficient laws, ideological and cultural differences, sanctions and blockades), interactive (corruption, bureaucracy and weak institutions, and similar).
 Tatjana Karaulac, “Country Risk, Foreign Direct Investments and NATO,” in Business and Security, eds. Miroslav Hadžić and Jelena Radoman, 59-90 (Belgrade: Center for Civil Military Relations, 2009), 74. Available at: http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/0910151810_business_and_securi.pdf
 Ibid., 77.
 “Economic benefits for Bulgaria from joining NATO,” The Employers Association of Bulgaria and the Center for Liberal Strategies, May 10, 2001, p. 8. Available at: http://www.cls-sofia.org/bg/uploaded/
 According to some estimates, before the war, BiH produced military products in the amount of about 1.5 billion USD, and the industry employed almost 40,000 people. During the war a large number of prewar capacities were destroyed, the market was lost, and a great deal of educated labor force were pushed out of BiH. See: Ivan Katavić, “Namjenska industrija na rubu propasti,” Radio Slobodna Evropa, December 2, 2010, http://www.danas.org/content/bih_namjenska_industrija/2254008.html (accessed May 14, 2013).
 When purchasing military equipment, many countries use offset programs for military technology transfer. Such contracts are long term, of 5 to 10 years. Compensation can be by counter-delivery – the export of goods or investments in domestic production. Various approaches are used, as well as different application of offset in developed, less developed, and transitional countries. Developed countries set offsets as conditions for investments in new technologies. Less developed countries set conditions of development of the local economy through technology transfer, participation in procurement programs, and investments in infrastructure. Thus, whether the offset is direct, in military production, or is indirect, it is in the service of the protection of national interests. See: D. Jacopec and D. Mikulić, “Proizvodnja naoružanja i vojne opreme u funciji tehnićke modernizacije OSRH,” Hrvatski vojnik 99 (September 2003), http://www.hrvatski-vojnik.hr/hrvatski-vojnik/992003/proizvodnja.asp.
 “Economic benefits for Bulgaria from joining NATO,” 14.
 Karaulac, 76-77.
 Ibid., 77.
 Article 84 of the Law on Defense of BiH, adopted in 2005, proscribes that the Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Ministers of BiH, the Presidency, and all defense subjects are obliged to conduct any necessary activities for BiH accession to NATO.
 See the Preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty
 Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty
 BiH is very involved in regional efforts – it is an active member of Sub-regional Arms Control through Article 4, Annex 1-B, of the Dayton Peace Agreement; the US-Adriatic Charter (A5); the South-East European Cooperative Initiative (SECI); The Migration, Asylum, and Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI); the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP); the Adriatic- Ionian Initiative, and more.
 Although neutrality is the current position of Serbia, it is notable that in its structural cooperation with NATO, Serbia uses the same tool as Bosnia and Herzegovina – the IPAP (Individual Partnership Action Plan). Kosovo has no structural cooperation with NATO yet.
 Artcle 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that, “The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”
 The goals of UN are to: maintain international peace and security, find peaceful solutions to international disputes in accordance with principles of international law, develop friendly relations among peoples based on the principle of equal rights, and to encourage international economic, cultural, and social activities with the purpose of creating joint interests that will prevent conflicts.
 “Kosovo Force (KFOR): Key Facts and Figures,” April 19, 2013, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/
pdf_2013_04/20130422_130419-kfor-placemat.pdf (accessed April 29, 2013).